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Introduction
Urban built environment and social realities reflect the class interests of those that have economic and political power to produce cities in their own imagination (Lefebvre 1996; Mitchell 2003) . Our highly unequal cities can therefore be regarded as the 'socially just' manifestation in the eyes of the ruling class. This calls for the urgency of conferring greater power to the marginalized and disenfranchized (Marcuse 2009 ). All too often, however, we hear less about the voices of those who bear the brunt of profit-seeking activities of the rich and powerful. Despite significant contributions to progressive urban politics, contemporary debates on social justice are in need of adequately capturing the local historical and sociopolitical processes of how people voice out and produce their own alternative discourses against the hegemonic establishments (Glassman 2013; Gramsci 1971) .
These limitations undermine the production of locally tuned alternative strategies to build progressive and just cities. This is where my focus on the voices of the urban protesters against displacement comes from. This paper is on the extension of on-going efforts among critical scholars to perceive social movements and grassroots activism as "knowledge-producers in their own right" rather than objects of study (Chesters 2012: 145) . By adopting a strategicrelational perspective, I examine the evolving nature of rights claims that were put forward by protesters against urban redevelopment and displacement, placing this in the context of condensed and speculative urbanization of South Korea (hereafter Korea). What the history of the evolution of rights discourses in Korea demonstrates is, I argue, how the urban poor as part of subordinate classes challenge the hegemony of private property rights, and how this is made possible through the solidarity among subordinate classes and the establishment of cross-class alliance.
The focus on Korea in this paper is helpful for advancing the scholarship, as the emergence of urban rights discourses or Korea's 'urban question' was in a political economic context that differed from the post-industrial economies of the West.
Urban movements in the West calling for strengthening urban rights and the protection of collective consumption was in the context of eroding Keynesian welfare state, economic crisis, austerity, and neoliberalization of urban services provision (c.f. Mayer 2009 ). Korea's experience of urban movements and the call for urban rights has been in the context of the strong authoritarian statism (in the 1960s-1980s in particular) that retained a close nexus with the capital (large businesses in particular), which refrained from the provision of universal welfare and emphasized individual/family responsibility for access to collective consumption including housing. Korea's experience also differs from the rest of Southeast/East Asian economies, because of its rich history of democracy movements that successfully challenged the state in the 1980s and 1990s, producing state-society relations that are markedly different from the era of the authoritarian state (Castells 1992; Park 1998; Shin, Lees and López-Morales 2016) . Such changes to the state-society relations in Korea produce a space of resistance and counter-hegemony, which in turn provides opportunities to collectively advance the urban rights discourses through active formation of alliance among classes and various sectors of (urban) social movements.
The study reconstructs the past trajectory of rights claims by urban protesters, focusing on the period between the 1980s and present. Given the limitations of longitudinal qualitative research that requires real-time and recurrent engagement with events and participants (Saldaña 2003) , the analysis in this paper makes use of both historical data and in-depth interviews. The main historical data include: (a) an archival collection of protesters' pamphlets and newsletters from the 1980s and Antonio Gramsci (1971) in his analysis of the state-society relations contends that a ruling class's overpowering of its subordinate classes is achieved through state domination in the political society and the construction of hegemony in civil society.
STATE REPRESSION, HEGEMONY AND URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
In his words, '[a] social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate", or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups' (Gramsci 1971: 57) . State domination largely rests on violence and coercion by mobilizing police, military and other law enforcements. By contrast, hegemony is exercised through "the consent and passive compliance of subordinate classes" (Scott 1985: 316) . This is where, according to James Scott, Gramsci's major contribution lies. Gramsci's discussion of hegemony construction is a fine elaboration on Karl Marx's and Friedrich Engels's 'ruling ideas of the epoch' held by the ruling class in possession of the means of material production, an important point they raised in
The German Ideology:
"The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it" (Marx and Engels 1965: 61 cited in Scott 1985: 315) Hegemony can be considered as the ruling class's imposition on subordinate classes who may internalize the ideologies of the ruling class (Gramsci 1971) . The ideological hegemony of the ruling class, aided by the use of coercive state apparatuses, condition the behavior of the subordinate classes who may be co-opted, persuaded and oppressed. If the ruling class manages to remain in power through the state domination and the construction of hegemony, the question is how the subordinate classes overthrow the ruling class.
Gramsci's concept of hegemony is often misread as to explain the failure of revolutionary movements (e.g., Scott 1985 ; also see the critique by Hart 1991), but it would be erroneous to conclude that hegemony works to keep the subordinate classes docile and submissive to the ruling class. Rather, as Jim Glassman (2013: 254) asserts, Gramsci's "conception of hegemony contains a sense of the internal dynamics that can lead to hegemony's collapse". In other words, the dialectical reading of hegemony, rooted in the political economy of capitalist accumulation and uneven development, allows room for the erosion of the very conditions that have given rise to the establishment of time-and place-bounded hegemony. Such understanding of hegemony calls for attention to the accumulation of latent antiestablishment movements that challenge the state domination and the dominant ideology of the ruling class on the one hand, and on the other, changing state-society relations.
Firstly, while studies on (urban) social movements may often focus on major societal disruptions (e.g., Tahrir Square in 2011, Tian'anmen Square in 1989 , Seoul Spring in 1980 and 1987 , it would be equally crucial to understand how such major disruptions are founded upon a series of quotidian and organized resistance in response to state repression and cooptation. As Paul Chang (2015: 7) ascertains, social movements evolve under both endogenous and exogenous pressures, and therefore, the study of social movements "need a diachronic view of movement evolution that accounts for the dynamic nature of contention over time". In this regard, Chang (2015) examines the build-up of anti-governmental oppositional movements by students, intellectuals and workers during the 1970s in South Korea in order to understand how the major burst of democracy and labor movements in the 1980s was possible.
Large-scale mass popular movements are therefore preceded by various practices of coalition building, ideological diversification and struggles, and the framing of each contesting group's resistance during the state of latency (Johnston, 2015) . Such struggles involve the subordinate classes in the production of their own set of vision and political will for just city, demonstrating a degree of organizational capacity in order to sustain long-term durability of their resistance to state repression (Routledge 2015a) . James Scott (1985) Secondly, the study of the evolutionary trajectories of urban social movements (e.g., struggles against forced eviction) requires the analysis of such struggles against the backdrop of changing state-society and socio-political relations, which are in turn embedded in broader socio-economic contexts. In the context of uneven development of capitalist accumulation, "geographical variations in the relationship between states and civil society actors are important in understanding the context from which social movements emerge" (Routledge 2015b: 386) . The dialectical reading of Gramsci's hegemony (Glassman 2013: 249) suggests that "economic developments are not…foundations on which politics are relatively built but rather a particularly crucial element of the entire context in which political outcomes like hegemony are generated". The geographies of (urban) social movements reflect the state-society relations of a particular time and space. In other words, the repressive capacity of the state, and by extension the hegemonic construction of ruling class ideology, enters into a contentious but constitutive relationship with movements, forming what Chang (2013) refers to as "protest dialectics".
As Boudreau (2004) sums up, the actions of the state shape the ways in which social movements are mobilized, and how they develop over time. However, the relationship between state repression and social movements may not entirely be linear. In an authoritarian state context such as the one found in the late 20th century South Korea, it is possible for the repressive state to effectively suppress, if not annihilate, dissidents or co-opt them by monopolizing violence and utilizing resources for its own legitimacy gains. The opposite scenario is also possible, that is, the social movements being fueled by the atrocity of the state violence. In summarizing the complicated non-linear relationship between state repression and social movements, Chang (2013: 7-9 ; original emphasis) suggests the disentanglement of the movement, "shift[ing] our focus away from the total quantity of protest events to the substantive quality of movement characteristics" including ideological development and protester's discourses as well as the forms and strategies of protest. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBANIZATION IN KOREA
Korea's urbanization can be described as condensed urbanization coupled with industrialization, a characteristic that the country shares with mainland China and other East Asian 'tiger' economies such as Taiwan and Singapore (Shin 2014 ). Dunford and Yeung (2011) report that East Asian economies took less than 30 years to reach a five-fold increase of their initial real GDP per capita from the time of economic take-off. Conversely, other 'advanced' economies such as the United Kingdom and the United States turned out to have taken more than 160 and 100 years respectively. Among the East Asian economies, Korea's pace was the fastest, having taken only about 22 years to achieve the above rate of development. Nationally, the rapid economic development was achieved by the establishment of industrial estates for export-oriented manufacturing, subsidizing the costs of production for industrialists by the developmental states whose legitimacy was garnered by their ability to achieve economic developmental goals without changing the social order (Castells 1992) . These industrial complexes were further supported by the construction of various infrastructure and service facilities, hence the accumulation of fixed capital in the built environment (Harvey 1978) . These sites of production accompanied urbanization to accommodate workers and their families as well as other service industries. Major cities in Korea such as Ulsan and Changwon came to develop in this way. As shown in Figure 1 , the 1960s and 1970s were the period of urbanization subordinated to industrialization, guided by the authoritarian and developmental state that channeled available resources (e.g., national savings, foreign loans) to subsidize the expansion of large businesses rather than expanding national welfare provision (Mobrand 2008; Park 1998; Woo-Cumings 1999) . Social welfare including housing was largely in the hands of individuals, hence the heavy dependence on families and social network of individuals under the productivist welfare system (Halliday 2000) .
From the mid-1980s onward, Korea entered a new era, characterized by decreasing rates of profit in the manufacturing sector, increasing costs of production, and relocation of those factories in search for low cost of labor in other countries (e.g., textile industry relocating to mainland China in the 1990s). The average net profit rate in the manufacturing industry turned out to be 16.9% between 1981 and 1990, while the figures for 1963-1971 and 1972-1980 were 39.7% and 27.7% respectively (Jung, 1995) . The mid-1980s also saw the net surplus in Korea's international trade, a turning point indeed for a country that depended heavily on export-oriented industry for its economic development. The resulting over-accumulation and surplus capital as well as the accumulation of wealth by the emerging middle classes in the country were met by the surge of real estate investment and speculative urbanization (Shin and Kim 2016) on the one hand, and by the labor movements calling for fairer share of surpluses as well as the social movements demanding democracy after more than two decades of authoritarian statism on the other (Koo 2001 ).
The absolute amount of real estate investments also grew rapidly from the late 1980s: in comparison with the 1987 figure, the size of real estate investments in 1993 essentially quadrupled (ibid.). Accordingly, whereas the share of real estate investment in gross fixed capital formation in 1987 was estimated to be 18.7%, this jumped to reach 30.8% in 1991 , and 36.1% in 1993 (The Bank of Korea, 2004 .
Throughout the 1990s, the figure remained at around 30% or above. Rampant speculation ensued due to price spikes in real estate. The average price of land in Korea increased by 2,976 times between 1964 and 2013, while the price of daily necessities (e.g., rice) grew by 50-60 times only. As of 2013, real estate assets accounted for about 89% of national assets (Ha, 2015) . In this context, with the industrial restructuring, it can be said that the post-1980s has seen the reversal of the relationship between urbanization and industrialization (see Figure 1) , whereby highly speculative nature of urbanization (real estate investment in particular) becomes more important for asset accumulation. That is, the investment in the built environment has come to focus more on expanding speculative real estate assets than the expansion of productive investments.
( Figure 1 about here) The result was the surge of urban redevelopment projects from the mid-1980s especially in Seoul, which has been the economic, political and cultural center of the country. Real estate speculation to maximize profits by closing rent gaps in redevelopment neighborhoods (López-Morales 2011; Shin 2009) has become a major means for families to build up their family assets, thus consolidating the hegemony of private property rights (Shin and Kim 2016) . Here, I am thinking of Ley and Teo's (2014) discussion of the rise of the 'cultural hegemony of property' in Hong Kong and Hsu and Hsu's (2013) proposition of 'the political culture of property' in Taiwan, all of which privileged private ownership of property supported the ascendancy of speculative real estate markets and profit-led urban redevelopment. Coupled with the aspiration of the authoritarian state to sanitize and modernize the urban landscape especially at the time of preparing for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games (Greene, 2003) , the developmental state embarked on a massive scale of displacement of the urban poor. For tenants in redevelopment project sites, there was initially little compensation during the early years of the program in the 1980s (Ha, 2001 ). An evictees' movement emerged eventually, further fueled by the democratization movement (KOCER 1998). More detailed pictures of changing statesociety relations will be visited during the discussions of changing urban rights discourses in the ensuing section.
URBAN PROTESTS AND THE GENEALOGY OF URBAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES 1980s: Saengjon'gwon or the Right to Subsistence
In order to understand the urban protests from the 1980s, it would be necessary to understand the experience of Korean democracy movements throughout the 1970s when the country was under the dictatorship of the then President Park Chung-Hee (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) . Through the use of police force, military, Korean Central Intelligence Agency and emergency decrees, the authoritarian state endeavored to undermine and suppress the civil society and oppositional movements, while pursuing economic development by forming a developmental alliance with large business conglomerates known as Chaebols in Korean. In this context, the focus of oppositional movements was on achieving democracy, led by university students, religious groups (especially, progressive Christians) and intellectuals (lawyers, journalists) (Chang 2015) . Labor movements were yet to be organized despite landmark, yet tragic, events such as the death of labor activist Chun Tae-il whose self-immolation was a wake-up call for Korean intellectuals, students and nascent labor activism. As for the protests by evictees, until the end of the 1970s, they remained isolated and sporadic, because of the high prevalence of substandard settlements and the government focus on their containment rather than unrealistic targets of complete eradication (Kim 2011) . As the alliance between the state and Chaebols had been at the center of economic development, the prevalence of substandard settlements was an effective means of minimizing the cost of labor reproduction for businesses (Mobrand 2008) .
It was from the early 1980s that urban protests against forced eviction began to be more organized, having faced an entirely hostile set of socio-economic and political conditions (Shim, 1994; Kim, 1999) . Politically, the state-business alliance was still (which was largely due to the schism between opposition parties), it was under pressure to devise compensation measures to appease tenants and maintain their legitimacy. After piloting a series of incremental measures, a new policy was introduced in 1989, which included the provision of cash (living costs for three months) or in-kind (tenancy in public rental housing) compensation (Kim et al., 1996: 109-110 ). This arrangement subsequently remained unchanged for more than a decade. The state concession could be considered as the fruits of the evictees' strenuous fights against the alliance of the state, developers and landlords-cumspeculators, supported by other sectors of social movements.
As the new compensation measures settled in, a new language of jugeo'gwon or the right to housing began to emerge from the early 1990s. Rather than confining tenants' protests to the obtention of saengjon'gwon, housing is to be seen as part of basic human rights and constitutional rights (Mr Y, 20 August 2013) (see Figure 3) .
A former student activist, who is now a district mayor in Seoul, recalls that "in the early to mid-1980s, the slogan was by and large to attain minjung saengjon'gwon The provision of public rental housing as in-kind compensation was considered by many as having met the saengjon'gwon of tenants experiencing forced eviction.
Protests continued to emerge from a number of redevelopment project sites in order to address unresolved issues such as support for temporary relocation, and more violent fights broke out sporadically involving groups of ineligible tenants against displacement. However, the attention of activists and progressive intellectuals began to steer towards improving the legal system for general housing welfare of the poor, Habitat II conference joined hands to establish action plans to legislate the Basic Housing Rights Act as part of advancing the right to housing (see Park and Kim 1998; Seo 1999 ).
The shift from saengjon'gwon to jugeo'gwon also reflects the rapidly diminishing stocks of affordable housing for the urban poor, resulting from mounting interests in real estate investments. The developmental state still kept its close nexus with businesses: Having previously faced resistance from the organized labor movements and with the decreasing rates of profit in the manufacturing sector, the statebusiness alliance opted for 'segyehwa' or globalization, involving selective overseas relocation of production bases, transnational investment, and liberalization of financial industry. The direct election of local assembly members, mayors and governors laid the foundation for the rise of local 'growth machines', further propelling investments in real estate properties and infrastructure. Large-scale urban redevelopment projects ensued especially in Seoul, which witnessed government efforts to transform the national capital into a world city, and involved active participation of construction subsidiaries of major chaebols. Rapidly disappearing affordable housing stocks and the sharp increase in housing rents due to megadisplacement of poor tenants led to growing awareness of housing as a basic right.
For many activists working in poor neighborhoods, the major concern in the 1990s was how to ensure the housing right of poor residents who faced eviction as such neighborhoods became subject to mega-redevelopment projects (BJUBW 2017) . The emphasis on housing rights continued to exert its presence, albeit with limited success, during the times of post-crisis Korean welfare statism that involved the establishment of social safety nets for the victims (including homeless people) of the economic crisis in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
2000s: Jeongju'gwon or the Right to Settlements
Despite the efforts by the civil society organizations to legislate the Basic Housing Rights Act, they faced a barrier especially due to the severe downturn of the national economy following the Asian financial crisis. In order to stimulate economic recovery, the promotion of real estate development remained intact (Ha 2010) . that the most frequently expressed slogan was the demand for the right to housing, but this was the result of education, helping them continue their fight. Kim's (2017) review of the history of local activism pre-dating redevelopment in the Hawang 2-1 redevelopment district reveals how the build-up of local activism throughout the 1980s and early 1990s enabled the effective organization of tenants' efforts to resist displacement. The tenants' organization was rooted in a children's study group organized by local activists for the poor in Hawang and adjacent neighborhoods.
Local activists, who settled down in the neighborhoods from 1987, held various educational sessions to inform children's mothers about redevelopment and displacement, and the mothers brought their husbands to be also involved when tenants' organization was to be formed. Mr Y quoted above was also one of the husbands. Local activists in the neighborhoods also came together to organize a local council of activists (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) to coordinate their activities. The key figures among the activists were a married couple, both of whom were seasoned activists for the poor. They began their activism from the early 1970s, and the husband in particular had experiences of working with tenants against displacement in the 1970s: such experiences turned out to be beneficial for the education of local activists in Hawang 2-1 district and adjacent neighborhoods (see Kim 2017) .
The solidarity among evictees, local activists, and other civil society organizations, as well as their efforts to pursue cross-class alliance is quite encouraging for achieving social justice through progressive urban movements, as these initiatives allow them not to be confined to their self-interest. For a number of more persistent protesters who continue to exercise activism and engage with long-term social movement, their long-term commitments seem to develop class consciousness. The chair of the Korea Evictees Association who has been leading the organization for more than two decades explains how his struggle for the right to housing has led to his realization of the importance of cross-class alliance: "Resolving the right to housing issue does not solve everything. We need to open our eyes to the labor movement too. Evictee's movement alone does not resolve capitalist contradictions. Workers, evictees and farmers all have to work together" (see Choi et al. 2009: 189) Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the fact that the efforts to legislate the Protection from Forced Eviction Act have been facing barriers suggest that the property hegemony persists. There has also been a degree of fragmentation among evictees and their organizations, resulting in the establishment of several umbrella organizations due to their different views on what would be the most effective tactics for housing rights struggle (see Park and Lee, 2012: 17-23 ), although they may still come together to collectively address major state oppressions like the Yongsan tragedy. Furthermore, the struggle by evictees has clear limitations of being a highly place-specific rights struggle that runs the danger of dissolution once a neighborhood disappears (interview with Mr Y on 20 August 2013). Local activists who worked hard in the 1980s and 1990s to create neighborhood-based grassroots organizations lamented that urban redevelopment projects disintegrated residents and that it was difficult to continue the organizational momentum after redevelopment and displacement. This testifies the destructive nature of urban redevelopment, posing serious threats to the growth of place-specific urban movements to advance the right to the city and achieve social justice.
CONCLUSION
Reflecting upon the Korean history of urban accumulation and injustice, the production of urban space has been undeniably in the imagination of the ruling class who imposed their own vision of an ideal city and of "a just social order" (Scott, 1985: 305) on subordinate classes. However, the voices of the tenants facing forced eviction and increasingly unaffordable housing costs have produced their own set of demands and narratives about the socially unjust nature of urban redevelopment. Their demands called for the guarantee of their saengjon'gwon (the right to subsistence) and jugeo'gwon (the right to housing), refusing to be denigrated as barriers to societal progress. The enactment of the National Basic Housing Rights Act in 2015 can be regarded as the culmination of the efforts made by the progressive urban movements. Various evictee organizations established in the early 1990s continue to operate until present, their longevity possibly helped by the on-going injustice in the production of the built environment and also by the experience of eviction as "shared emotional connections" (Bosco 2007 ) that bind them together.
With the changing economic climate that questions high rates of economic development and real estate accumulation, there emerges an opportunity to think of a new way of imagining and building a new Seoul. It is perhaps about time to revisit the legalist agenda put forward nearly three decades ago when the National Coalition of Housing Rights was established in 1990 and efforts were made to secure the right to housing for the general population. As the advocates of the right to the city often point out (see Marcuse 2009; Harvey 2003; Mitchell 2003) , the legal provision is only one of many necessary conditions for the realization of a new alternative way of producing just cities.
Facilitated by a broader cross-class alliance, fights for the collective consumption such as housing have a direct potential to make this possible (see Harvey 2013; Merrifield, 2014) . It is about time to rethink seriously the ramification of speculative urbanization and gentrification, and embark on producing "a genuinely humanizing urbanism" (Harvey 1976 (Harvey /2009 that realizes a vision that places people at the center and not profit (Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2009) . In this regard, the emergent discourses of the right to the city in Korea in recent years can be considered as an assuring positive shift, as such a move propels progressive Korean urban politics to go beyond the residential domain of urban social movements, and to be inclusive of commercial tenants and other forms of inhabiting space.
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